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Rahner on Sprachregelung: 
Regulation of Language? Of Speech?
Frans Jozef van Beeck, S.J.
Introduction: Homage to Karl Rahner
The late Karl Rahner’s elder Jesuit brother Hugo, a fi ne scholar 
as well as a fi ne stylist, is said to have quipped at one time that he 
hoped to become famous in his old age by translating Karl into German. 
Yet Karl’s works did win for their author, in 1973, the Sigmund Freud 
Prize for Scholarly Prose of the German Academy for Language and 
Literature, with the citation stating: “The master of the literary word has 
succeeded in winning a new hearing for the word of religion” (Weger 
1984:8). What a striking contrast between two appraisals!
The fi rst, humorous remark calls to mind the high degree of 
abstraction, formalism, and technicality in Rahner’s theology, where 
terms have to be distinguished: existentiell is not identical with existential, 
and formell is not the same as formal, and the “transcendental” must 
be carefully told apart from the “categorical.” This aspect of Rahner’s 
works, if we apply Walter Ong’s analysis, is associated with the visual, 
the objectifying, the analytical, the logical—in short, with the kind 
of literacy that is associated with reading, with concentration on, and 
analysis of, words and terms, and further down the road, with scientifi c 
method, along with its panoply of terminological tools.
There is a second aspect to Rahner’s works—the one which the 
Deutsche Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung, in awarding him the 
prize, must mainly have had in mind. Rahner’s work has deep roots in the 
literary world, where the living word, oral-acoustical, the interpersonal, 
the synthetic, and the rhetorical are predominant. In fact, the citation 
makes explicit reference to this: Rahner has won a new hearing for 
the word of religion. After all, the word Sprache, in the name of the 
Academy that
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awarded the prize, conveys a concern not only with “language” and 
“usage,” but also with “speech” —not only with langue/langage, but also 
with parole, in F. de Saussure’s classical distinction. Rahner has indeed 
greatly enriched the German language and the usage of theology viewed 
as the stable, available linguistic equipment scholarly theology needs; 
in this way, he has succeeded in making large new areas of cultural and 
religious experience habitually amenable to theological expression and 
discussion. But this success is rooted in a more fundamental achievement 
in the area of live speech: once touched by Rahner, the German language 
and the language of theology have sounded differently. Many of Rahner’s 
formulas have rung a new note; a new excitement and a new eloquence 
have been brought to the international theological conversation.
This second, literary aspect of Rahner’s work is most prominent 
in some of his more “popular” writings in the areas of pastoral practice 
and spirituality, and in his many interviews, recently published—all 
of them models of liveliness and depth. Still, it is by no means absent 
from the “heavier” writings, which is consistent with the fact that 
a large portion of Rahner’s works, especially his essays in the many 
volumes of the Theological Investigations, were not written by him at 
all, but, of all things, dictated—periodic sentences and second-order 
abstractions and all. What we read, in other words, is very often live 
speech edited for the purposes of publication. Augustine preaching 
and Thomas Aquinas dictating come to mind, both of them with their 
scribes scribbling. Hans Urs von Balthasar, who has tended to claim the 
great aesthetic traditions of the Christian West as the principal source 
of his theology, once conceded in an interview that Rahner has been 
“the strongest theological power of our day”; but he then proceeded 
to characterize the distinctive difference between himself and Rahner 
as follows: “. . . our points of departure were always different, really. 
There is a book by Simmel, entitled Kant und Goethe. Rahner opted 
for Kant, or Fichte, if you wish—the transcendental starting-point. And 
like the Germanist I am, I opted for Goethe” (Herder-Korrespondenz 
1976:75-76). Let the last sentence of this confession pass; the one 
before that, in its baldness, does Rahner, a life-long reader of poetry, and 
his written work, with its strong undertow of literary and theological 
passion, a serious injustice. “Much of what Rahner wrote may be stiff
reading. But that is no reason to deny he had the gift of literary
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language-use” (Weger 1984:8).
Noticing the coexistence of these two, the periodic sentence and 
the accoutrements of second-order abstraction, is a good way to approach 
the literary complexity of Rahner’s work. For all its high literacy, the 
periodic sentence hails from the world of rhetoric, with its cultivation 
of conviction, persuasion, and loyalty; it is a product of the tradition 
that has Cicero and Quintilian for its masters. The other ingredient, 
the abstractions, along with their daunting array of terminology, hail 
from the dispassionate world of methodical intellectual operations, 
aware—with a clarity that certainly goes back to the Aufklärung, but 
beyond that to scholasticism—of their uses, but also of their limitations. 
Walter Ong has explained that thought in a “preliterate,” that is to say, 
a rhetorical culture is bound up not with dispassionate observation, 
but with the dynamic world of interpersonal communication; once the 
world has been made “objective,” set off from the personal world as 
essentially neuter—in the best Kantian fashion—thought is exercised 
no longer as a response to the world but as an operation upon it (Ong 
1970:22ff.). One of the attractive features of Rahner’s work is precisely 
the harmonious, yet tensile, co-existence of two styles of thought, along 
with their corresponding linguistic styles. On the one hand, we have 
faith seeking to address Church and World, as well as trying to respond 
to them, both with a passion; on the other hand, we have the same faith 
dispassionately seeking for its own foundation, and probing Church and 
World to fi nd the core of their integrity: the periodic sentence and the 
terminological tool.
“Sprachregelung”
No wonder that Rahner, so eloquent and at the same time so 
formal a writer, came to take a strong interest in the status of theological 
language. More particularly, he came to take a strong interest in what 
he called Sprachregelung, “linguistic ruling” (Rahner 1966:54ff.): the 
communal, i.e., ecclesiastical, fi xation of doctrine in terminological 
form. The word fi rst occurs in an essay entitled “What is a Dogmatic 
Statement?”, fi rst published, in German, in 1961. Over the next ten 
years, Rahner regularly returned to the subject, as appears from the lists 
of citations in the Schriften zur Theologie, which give the original dates 
and occasions of the individual essays.1
It appears that Rahner saw the need for a treatment of the
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meaning of terminological doctrine mainly in three related areas of 
theological inquiry, namely, (1) the relationship between kerygma and 
dogma, (2) ecumenical relations, and (3) the obligations imposed by 
magisterial defi nitions.
Sensitivity to the tension between the (“kerygmatic”) language 
of faith and the formal language of dogma, as well as their relative 
autonomy, became a fundamental feature of Rahner’s thought. His 
main emphasis came to be on the fact that the latter is an intellectual 
specialization, and hence a limitation, of the former, and one dependent 
on historical circumstances (esp. Rahner 1966:54-58).
In treating ecumenical matters, Rahner came to apply this 
specialization-concept. It allowed him to explore the implications of 
pluralism, and thus to show the signifi cance of dialogue—dialogue 
among Catholics and with other Christians, but also with non-Christians. 
This dialogue, Rahner argued, was not only possible as a matter of 
principle, given the partiality of divergent dogmatic expressions. It was 
also a downright requisite for the deeper understanding of one’s own 
faith-commitment; ultimately, it would remind all participants of the 
basic function of all theological and religious language—the reductio in 
mysterium (Rahner 1969:85-87; 1974b:40-42; 1974d:251-52).
The authority of terminological dogma is not Rahner’s most 
fundamental theme, yet it appears to be the one he treats with the highest 
sense of urgency. It is never far to seek, not even when the fi rst two areas 
are the principal subject of discussion. It was this issue which brought 
Rahner face to face with the issue of the unity of the Catholic Church 
in believing, and, in connection with this, with the functions of the 
magisterium. What is the obligatory force of terminological dogma, and 
how is its interpretation to be regulated (Rahner 1974a:14-17; 1974c:112-
13; 1974e:21ff.; 1974f:131-32)? The controversy surrounding Hans 
Küng’s Infallible? occasioned much pointed discussion along these 
lines (Rahner 1976a:62-65; 1976b:78-83). Still, we should not forget 
that the question had already come up much earlier, and in a far quieter, 
more speculative context, when Rahner was pleading for an alternative 
terminology in trinitarian theology (Rahner 1970:108— “regulation of 
language”).
Terminological Dogma: From Meaning to Function
Now what is interesting—certainly from an “Ongian” point of
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view—is that Rahner, in treating the problems connected with 
terminological dogma, refers only to the problem of meaning involved. 
His theme is, invariably, that the meaning of these dogmatic expressions, 
is relative: relative, that is, to the original kerygmatic expressions, to 
other approaches to the same mystery, to the ecclesiological issue of 
unity in believing, and ultimately to the mystery involved in and behind 
the proposition.
Rahner is not by any means alone in treating the issue in this way. 
In fact, while his distinctive contribution lies in his particular conception 
of the “relativity” of doctrine, and in his reasons for it, he scarcely differs 
with any other theologian on the basic question as to what the issue is, 
namely, one of meaning: the interpretation of terminological doctrines 
is a cognitive matter. It is both interesting and a bit surprising to watch 
such a sensitive and eloquent stylist as Rahner agreeing with most of his 
colleagues, and even with the Roman Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith, on this basic point.
The observation just made is important. It involves the realization 
that terminological dogma is widely regarded, among theologians, as 
regulated language. Hence the standard practice of interpretation: one 
concentrates on a fi xed dogmatic text (preferably set in its historical, and 
especially its literary, context) in order to establish what this particular 
doctrine means.
This essay is written to suggest that this concentration on 
the cognitive (in Ongian terms, the predominantly visual) function 
of doctrine is incomplete. Dogmatic propositions, even the most 
terminological ones, can, and often do, also function in affective (that is 
to say, predominantly oral-acoustical) ways. We will argue, therefore, 
that terminological dogma often involves the regulation of speech. To 
make this case, some preliminary observations of a general linguistic 
nature are in order.
Connotation in Natural Language
The distinction most frequently used to deal with the way words 
function is that between denotation and connotation: words “say” more 
than that which is amenable to our cognitive constructs. Words connote. 
That is part of their attractiveness: they are not only precise; they are also 
eloquent. This applies not only to individual words, but also, and even 
more, to word-complexes: they say more than they say. This means, 
very concretely, that they betray, even in written or printed form, that
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they “address,” not only issues, but also people in situations: they create 
an audience in the very act of conveying thought. Much of the time, 
such situations and audiences are incidental: many utterances are ad hoc, 
fl eeting, and impermanent; most language is the verbal accompaniment 
of the ways in which we do this, that, and the other thing with Tom, 
Dick, and Harry.
But there are situations that are more permanent, and they are 
characterized by stable patterns of connotative language-use, especially 
if those situations are “natural”: the family, the village, the tribe, even 
the school. These permanent human confi gurations are characterized, 
as Walter Ong has not tired of pointing out, by language-use that is 
strongly formulary: myths, epics, sagas, legends, proverbs, tribal 
histories, family stories, playground cant, and what have you. Notice 
that the term “connotation” is really too weak to convey all that is 
involved here; it is better to resort to a term like “function” to approach 
the issue. The formulary usages of more or less permanent natural 
human confi gurations function as the bearers of the group’s identity, 
and those who speak and listen in these situations react, not so much to 
what is said or heard, as to the way the words are used appropriately, 
i.e., as a function of the understanding and the loyalty that hold the 
group together. In joining such a group, we learn the usage before we 
get the understanding.
Meaning and Use of Terms
In what we have said so far, we have been dealing with the 
formulary use of natural language, whose constitutive elements are 
what we know as words—”regular” words. But our language, even our 
everyday language, employs not only words, but also terms: special 
words, usually (though by no means always) derived from foreign 
roots; words which you have to know how to pronounce and use right, 
because they tend to have very precise, usually abstract meanings laid 
down by defi nition. In other words, terms are maximally denotative, at 
least in intention; in fact, one defi nition of “term” is: a word without 
connotations, to be used exclusively in the service of rational discourse 
about objective realities. Yet at the same time, terms look and sound, 
certainly to the non-initiated, a lot like formulas, and so the question 
arises: do terms also function as bearers of community loyalty?
The answer is obvious: yes. But we must be careful here. In 
natural language, there is a close, spontaneous connection
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between the meaning of a word and its appropriate use, between its 
cognitive meaning and its rhetorical impact. In the case of terms, no such 
close connection prevails. Terms mean what they are defi ned to mean, 
and hence, the rules for their appropriate use are rather more extrinsic 
to their meaning (Verhaar 1963:133-34). Armed with this knowledge, 
we can easily see how terms function as bearers of community loyalty: 
terms bestow “membership in the profession,” but only on those 
who both understand what they mean and have learned to use them 
appropriately.
“Displacement” of Terms
Now it is one of the characteristics of our technological, highly 
literate age that “sounding educated” often means “using technical 
terminology”; we associate knowledge with expertise, with a panoply 
of technical terms—that is to say, with cognitive meaning as it is shared 
among professionals. But this also means that we live in an age in which 
many terms are liable to revert, as it were, to the realm of natural language. 
Terms are born at one or more removes from natural language; then, on 
account of the spread of education, the popularization of professional 
knowledge, and the authority of such knowledge, hundreds of terms 
fi nd their way back into natural language. This chain of events creates 
a very real problem, which is connected with the relatively loose link 
between the meaning of a term and its appropriate use. When a term 
is used outside the sphere of rational discourse, some of the normal 
ambiguity and vagueness of natural language comes back to it, but in an 
uncontrolled way, “through the back door, dragging along a number of 
implicit assumptions not always easily detected” (Verhaar 1969:22).
There is nothing necessarily sinister in this, though it is true that 
advertisers, mellowspeakers, and ideologues abuse precisely this quality 
of terms in the interest of “hidden persuasion”: lots of prejudice and 
unexamined loyalty is expressed and promoted by means of computerese, 
sociologese, journalese, economese, nationalese, theologese. The 
problem is not that the quasi-natural-language use of terms conveys 
and creates non-professional loyalties, but that these loyalties are 
hard to examine. That is why operators, fast talkers, rhetoricians, and 
sophists—the well-intentioned as well as the unscrupulous, and also the 
merely mindless—love to use terms: there’s no loyalty like unexamined 
loyalty.
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Terminological Dogma and the Profession of Loyalty
Abusus non tollit usum is one of the many maxims once 
taught in seminaries: the fact that something is abused is no reason 
for its abolition. While it is right to conclude from the foregoing that 
terminological doctrine is likely to be correctly understood and used 
only by a small minority of professionals, it is wrong to conclude that 
only professionals may use it. The Christian tradition has, at any rate, 
encouraged the opposite. Terminology has become part of the ordinary, 
that is to say, the live, oral-acoustical profession of faith.2  What we 
should also conclude, however, is that the non-professional use of 
doctrinal terminology can be expected to involve not so much meaning 
or precise understanding as profession of loyalty, and that this will 
show in a certain lack of proportion between the term’s (rhetorical) 
signifi cance and its (cognitive) meaning.
This essay will test this hypothesis in the case of three 
terminological doctrinal defi nitions, viz. Jesus Christ’s consubstantiality 
with the Father in Godhead; the change, by transubstantiation, of bread 
and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ; and the infallibility of the 
ecclesiastical magisterium in matters of faith and morals.
Homoousios
Christ’s “consubstantiality with the Father” occurs in the Creed 
promulgated at Nicaea in 325 A.D. It found its way into the so-called 
Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed: “And [we believe] in one Lord 
Jesus Christ, [. . . .] of one substance [homoousion] with the Father.” 
It is part of the tradition of the undivided Church. The term has a very 
precise meaning: every predicate attributable to the Father must also be 
attributed to Christ, except “Father”; Christ is the Son. However, several 
observations are in order.
 First, this clarity is the product of hindsight. Anyone familiar 
with the Arian controversies of the fourth and fi fth centuries knows 
how long it took before this precise focus was a matter of consensus. 
That Arius was wrong was, perhaps, not too hard to establish, but many 
found the mandatory use of a suspect technical term—homoousios—by 
way of remedy worse than the disease; while it took care of Arianism, 
it seemed to introduce new, equally undesirable errors. It took the best 
part of the fourth
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century to discover, in the course of much confusing debate, just how 
restricted—if crucial—the area of affi rmation covered by homoousios 
really was. And this lack of precision has continued. I have even met 
theologians who were less than entirely clear on the point.
Secondly, this lack of precision in the fourth and fi fth centuries 
did not prevent the term from being abundantly used—mainly as an 
ecclesiastical loyalty-fl ag. But since the fourth century also witnessed 
the gradual establishment of orthodox Christianity as the sole religion 
(Theodosius, Cunctos populos, 380), the emperors, both of the West and 
of the East, developed a taste for using homoousios as a civil loyalty 
test, too. Similarly, on the other side, we have the professed Arianism 
of the Ostrogoths under Theodoric and his successors in the late fi fth 
and early sixth centuries, over against the orthodoxy of the old Roman 
establishment, over which they held military sway. There is every reason 
to doubt the strictly theological signifi cance of both.
This enormous disproportion between the (mainly oral) use of 
homoousios as a loyalty-marker and its (literate) use to express orthodoxy 
is paralleled by the use of transubstantiation, albeit with a difference.
Transubstantiation
Transubstantiation defi nes the change of bread and wine into the 
Body and Blood of Christ in the Eucharist. The dogma was fi rst laid 
down by the fourth Lateran Council of 1215. More than three centuries 
later, in 1551, the Council of Trent picks up the terminology, states that 
the substances of bread and wine are entirely changed into the substances 
of the Body and Blood of Christ, and adds that this change has been 
aptly and properly been called transubstantiation. Now the question is: 
What is the reason for the aptness and propriety of the term? What, in 
other words, is the target of the affi rmation? The question is of great 
ecumenical signifi cance, for acceptance of transubstantiation separates 
the Catholic Church from the Reformation.
It turns out that the meaning of “transubstantiation” is 
surprisingly restricted. Around the time of the fourth Lateran Council, 
“transubstantiation” and the affi rmation of the real presence were simply 
“two sides of a single coin” (McCue 1967:92), with no affi rmations 
implied about the way in which the real presence was thought to come 
about. In fact, authorities like
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Peter of Capua and Lothar of Segni, who as Pope Innocent III was to 
preside over Lateran IV, considered the three prevalent theories about the 
coming about of the real presence (“consubstantiation,” “annihilation,” 
and “transubstantiation”3) a matter of theological opinion, even though 
they themselves favored the third explanation. “Transubstantiation,” 
therefore, at this point, had two meanings. In the defi nition of Lateran 
IV, it simply affi rms the real presence, whereas as a concept among 
theologians it defi ned one way in which the real presence was responsibly 
thought to come about. It was only a generation later that Aquinas 
argued that annihilation and consubstantiation were both illogical and 
heretical, and only transubstantiation orthodox, but interestingly, he did 
not quote Lateran IV in support of his position. Fifty years later, Scotus 
and Ockam disagreed: they found consubstantiation intellectually more 
attractive than transubstantiation, but since Lateran IV had made the 
latter an article of faith, they viewed “transubstantiation” as simply a 
matter of authoritative doctrine, not of conceptual understanding. This, 
of course, goes a long way towards explaining why the only claim Trent 
made in regard to the term “transubstantiation” was that the real change 
of the eucharistic elements is “aptly and properly so named” (McCue 
1967).
Transubstantiation is an intriguing term, a fact which helps to 
explain why it has functioned so prominently in theological debate and 
controversy, even down to our own day. At the same time, the doctrine 
of transubstantiation is conceptually feeble: while affi rming the real 
presence, it does not provide insight into its structure. This, however, 
has not prevented it from being vigorously alleged as a mark of loyalty. 
In this regard, it both resembles homoousios, and differs from it: like 
homoousios, transubstantiation has functioned as a loyalty-badge, but 
whereas the former can be shown to have a very precise logic, the latter 
is little more than an authoritative term of considerable oral-acoustical 
weight to convey and commend the realism of the Catholic eucharistic 
tradition.
Infallible Magisterium
Infallibility expresses the freedom from error in teaching faith 
and morals enjoyed by the Church’s teaching offi ce, whether papal or 
collegial-episcopal, under certain conditions. The exercise of infallible 
papal magisterium was defi ned at the fi rst Vatican Council in 1870; 
episcopal-collegial infallibility, while made much of
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at Vatican II, has never been formally defi ned.
In a recent book, the nature of magisterial authority, both of 
the “non-defi nitive” and the “defi nitive” (infallible) kind, has been 
explained with exquisite clarity (Sullivan 1983). What is striking in the 
book, from a literary point of view, is the care with which its author 
argues the limitations of infallible magisterium—something which may 
worry some readers. What is especially striking is the way in which the 
author argues the limits of the object of infallibility. Thus, for instance, 
he denies that matters of natural law can ever be the object of infallible 
teaching by the ordinary universal magisterium—a position highly 
relevant to the interpretation of Humanae vitae (Sullivan 1983:119-52). 
Yet while stressing the limits of infallibility, the book clearly shows a 
high esteem for the teaching offi ce, and it does everything to commend 
a responsible, mature attitude of respect and obedience, on the part of 
the faithful, towards all authentic teaching in the Church, whether non-
defi nitive or defi nitive.
The reason behind this apparently negative tendency in the 
book is not far to seek: while the target area of infallibility as a defi ned 
doctrine is very narrow—and relatively few theologians and bishops are 
so keenly aware of this as Father Francis Sullivan—its non-professional 
use as a loyalty-marker is extremely broad. The latter use really bears 
out the characteristic Catholic faith-attitude. This attitude is not so 
much concerned with the precise defi nition of the pope’s infallibility, as 
with a particular practice of universal papal jurisdiction and episcopal 
governing authority, which is vastly more infl uential in everyday life 
in the Church than the infallibility-dogma. Again, as in the case of 
homoousios and transubstantiation, the term infallibility shows a big 
gap between its professional, literate use as a cognitive counter, and its 
natural-language, oral-acoustical use as a loyalty-marker.
Three Conclusions
This essay has been written to illustrate how Catholic theology 
has gained enormously from the two infl uences at work in Karl Rahner’s 
theological achievement: the formal-literate and the rhetorical-literary. 
It has also been written to say that in the latter area theology stands to 
gain even more from the insights of scholars like Walter Ong if it wants 
to overcome its onesidedly cognitive biases, which are noticeable even 
in so literary a theologian as Karl Rahner. Hence, three conclusions to 
wind up.
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First, dogma is a determination, or normative regulation, not only 
of language, in the form of canonized pronouncements authoritatively 
taught, but also of speech, in the form of formulary professsions of faith 
and loyalty couched in “displaced” terminological language. The two 
must be carefully distinguished, so that both may be truly appreciated.
Secondly, there tends to be a notable gap between the meaning 
of terminological dogmatic language and its use in the ordinary 
profession of faith. This realization should infl uence the practice of 
theological hermeneutics: theologians should ask not just what certain 
dogmatic formulas mean, or meant, in cognitive terms, to theological 
professionals, but also in the interest of what affective concerns they are, 
or were, regularly used.
Thirdly, loyalty is fi ne, but the formulas that carry it are often 
the carriers of prejudice, too. This has special relevance to ecumenical 
theology. It is easier to change minds than habits of speech; different 
ideas can co-exist, side by side, in the same space, while different voices 
are harmonious only if they are “in synch.” In many areas of the faith, 
it is not doctrine that separates us, but formulas. They need not do so, 
provided the different formulas are given equal time, so that all involved 
can attune the ears of faith to them.
Loyola University of Chicago 
Notes
1The idea of Sprachregelung is found even earlier, in an essay on Mystici Corporis, 
where the expression “determined terminology,” in a footnote, translates the German expression 
terminologische Festlegung (Rahner 1963:66, n. 83). Vols. I-X of the Schriften zur Theologie are 
covered by the Rahner-Register, a birthday present on the occasion of Rahner’s 70th (Register 
1974). Vols. XI-XVI have (not quite complete) indexes; Sprachregelung does not occur in 
them. However, in Theological Investigations, vol. 18 (the translation of most of Schriften 
XIII), the mistranslation “linguistic usage” reflects German Sprachregelung (Rahner 1984:25-
28, 51, 110; Galvin 1984:367).
2This live profession has taken two characteristically oral-acoustical shapes. The first 
is liturgy; the Creed, including its technical terms, is recited and even sung at Sunday Eucharist. 
The second is catechesis (Gk. katechesis, meaning “instruction,” etymologically connected with 
“echo”), which reflects ancient question-and-answer teaching habits to cultivate loyalty as much 
as orthodoxy; cf. Lk 2, 46 and John 16, 30, where “questioning” means “teaching.”
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3“Consubstantiation” explains the real presence by holding that, after the consecration, 
the substances both of the Body and Blood of Christ and of the bread and wine co-exist in 
union with each other. “Annihilation” explains it by positing a replacement of the substances 
of bread and wine—which are annihilated—by the substances of the Body and Blood of Christ. 
“Transubstantiation” explains it by stating that the substances of bread and wine are changed 
into the substances of Christ’s Body and Blood.
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